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When Do Types Induce the Same Belief Hierarchy?

Working Papers
Andrés Perea, Willemien Kets
Working Paper

Challenging Conformity: A Case for Diversity

Working Papers
Willemien Kets, Alvaro Sandroni
Working Paper, Northwestern University

Why do diverse groups outperform homogeneous groups in some settings, but not in others?  We show that while diverse groups experience more frictions than homogeneous ones, they are also less conformist. Homogeneous teams are optimal when it is critical to avoid miscoordination. However, when there are significant opportunities to implement new efficient practices, diverse groups perform better.

Robust Multiplicity with a Grain of Naivete

Working Papers
Aviad Heifetz, Willemien Kets
Working Paper, Northwestern University

Ranking Friends

Journal Articles
Yossi Feinberg, Willemien Kets
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 107, pp. 1-9

What type of interaction structure is most conducive to sustaining cooperation? How does this depend on the possibilities to monitor others’ behavior?

Ambiguous Language and Common Priors

Journal Articles
Joseph Y. Halpern, Willemien Kets
Games and Economic Behavior 90, pp. 171-180

Natural language is often ambiguous; the same message can be interpreted in different ways by different people. Using a framework that distinguishes between the language in which statements are made and the interpretation of statements, we demonstrate that players may come to have different beliefs starting from a common prior, even if they have received exactly the same
information. So, the common-prior assumption is hard to justify in the presence of ambiguity.

A logic for reasoning about ambiguity

Journal Articles
Joseph Y. Halpern, Willemien Kets
Artificial Intelligence 209, pp. 1-10

Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games

Journal Articles
Willemien Kets
Journal of Economic Theory 146, pp. 300-325

It is well-known that game-theoretic predictions can be extremely sensitive to small perturbations in higher-order beliefs.  If, however, outcomes are robust to a wider range of perturbations in a subclass of games, then we need to be less concerned with the potential sensitivity of predictions when that class of games models the strategic situation we are interested in. I identify a class of  economically important games for which robust predictions can be obtained.

Inequality and network structure

Journal Articles
Willemien Kets, Garud Iyengar, Rajiv Sethi, Samuel Bowles
Games and Economic Behavior 73, pp. 215--226

Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty

Working Papers
Willemien Kets
Working Paper, Northwestern University

Learning to be prepared

Journal Articles
Willemien Kets, Mark Voorneveld
International Journal of Game Theory 37, pp. 333-352

An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

Journal Articles
Mark Voorneveld, Willemien Kets, Henk Norde
International Journal of Game Theory 33, pp. 479--490